
Diplomacy
What is behind the violence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo?
Image source: Shutterstock / SevenMaps
On January 27 the African Union called for an immediate halt to the conflict that has flared up in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
The call came in the wake of fresh violence as the M23 rebel group, one of around 100 armed groups present in the country and vying with the central authorities for a foothold in its economic resources, assumed control of Goma, the largest city in eastern DRC.
Fighting an inadequate and reportedly demoralized state army, M23 has, in contrast, proven to be organized in conventional warfare. They are aligned with the Tutsi minority, and are allegedly supported by the Rwandan Kagame government.
The M23 – Armed ‘Rwandophones’
The fundamental problem, aside from the basic motivation of a power grab, lies in the internal conflict of opinion and loyalty among the DRC’s population itself that has empowered M23.
The group is under the control of ethnic Tutsis, claiming that a military force is necessary to safeguard the rights of its minority group.
Taking their moniker from a previous failed peace deal—signed on March 23, 2009—M23 is supported by neighboring Rwanda, from where many Tutsis fled during the Hutu-led genocide in 1994.
M23 today is built on certain remnants of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), which was a rebel force at war with the DRC government between 2006 and 2009.
They continue to insist that the Congolese Tutsi in north and south Kivu suffer discrimination.Today, M23’s rebels mostly hail from North Kivu province in Eastern DRC, notably from Masisi and Rutshuru, close to the Rwandan border—an area that contains Goma. In fact, the members of the M23, being of Rwandan descent, are widely known as ‘Rwandophones.’
Rwanda continues to deny funding M23 despite over a decade of UN insistence to the contrary.
Compounding the issue, some of those Hutus behind the 1994 genocide form the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group still present in eastern DRC.
And for the M23, this gives the lie to official claims of Tutsis’s fundamental security within the DRC.
Rwanda, meanwhile, blames the DRC for tolerating the FDLR, claiming a threat to its national security.
The Lure of Natural Resources
The DRC is, of course, host to rich mineral reserves, never far from mind during the past 30 years of on-off conflict in the wake of the aforementioned Rwandan genocide.
The border region with Rwanda is also a major trade route in close proximity to mining facilities that yield gold, tin, cobalt (increasingly essential as the world effects a gradual switch to electric vehicles), and coltan, a key component of modern electronic devices.
This commercial hub, effectively held for ransom, is unofficially taxed by armed factions. M23 has already seized a number of mining areas.
The UN in late 2024 reported that the group was sending roughly 120 tons of coltan monthly to Rwanda, contributing to the close-to-doubling of Rwandan mineral exports over the past two years, but prompting a further denial from Kigali.
UN and regional peacekeeping forces have largely failed to prevent the periodic flare-up of armed conflict in the DRC. And given the massive wealth at stake the current scenario does not indicate being just the latest in an insurmountable deadlock between rival ethnicities and commercial concerns.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT